"Approved For Release 2005/12/05 : CIA-RDP82M00345R000700010031-4 64.76-3759

Department of Justice Mashington, D.C. 20530

JUL 6 19/6

Anthony A. Lapham, Esquire General Counsel Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Lapham:

This is in response to your letter of June 8, 1976, requesting my opinion as to the possible effect of Executive Order 11905 and 18 U.S.C. § 2511 on the use by CIA in the United States of audio countermeasures (ACM). It is my opinion that the use of ACM in the manner described in the memorandum of June 1, 1976, to you from the Director of Security would not violate either of these provisions.

Electronic surveillance is defined in the Executive Order as:

acquisition of a non-public communication by electronic means, without the consent of a person who is a party to, or, in the case of a non-electronic communication, visibly present at, the communication.

Sec. 5(a)(3). The Order specifically states that CIA "shall not perform electronic surveillance within the United States," except for the purpose of testing equipment. Sec. 5(b)(2). In our view, this prohibition against the "perform[ance]" of electronic surveillance must reasonably be interpreted to relate to activities the purpose of which is the acquisition of non-public communications



Approved For Release 2005/12/05 i CHARD PERM 00345 R000 7000 1203 b4 ty thereto. That is, it should not be read to prohibit activity which in fact has an altogether different purpose, but which incidentally and beyond the control of CIA does acquire some non-public communications. To construe Section 5(b)(2) in that fashion would virtually prohibit the use of an ordinary telephone, because of the not uncommon occurrence of crossed lines. As we understand, in the use of ACM there is no intent to acquire non-public communications without the consent of a party, and the incidental acquisition of such communications is in fact a hindrance.

Of course if the ACM operation were to discover a "bug" in the process of transmission, it could be viewed as intentionally acquiring a non-public communication. I presume, however, that the persons whose facilities are being "swept" have consented to such sweeps, and the acquisition of their non-public communications being transmitted by the "bug", being consensual, would not constitute electronic surveillance within the definition of Section 5(a)(3) of the Executive Order.

With respect to the effect of 18 U.S.C. § 2511: I believe, for the same reasons as were pertinent to the prohibition of the Executive Order, that that section does not bar the use of ACM by CIA in the United States. In addition, I believe the use of ACM could reasonably fall within the reservation of Presidential power in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3), so that the prohibitions of Chapter 119, Title 18, United States Code, would not apply.

Sincerely,

Antonin Scalia Assistant Attorney General Office of Legal Counsel

nlelman

By:

Leon Ulman

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Office of Legal Counsel

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

OGC 76-3775

8 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

Legislative Counsel Director of Security

SUBJECT:

Audio Countermeasures

- 1. I am attaching a memorandum dated 6 July 1976 from the Department of Justice on the subject of CIA audio countermeasure activities. The essential message is that such activities, as described in the memorandum to me from the Director of Security dated 1 June 1976, do not violate any statutory or Executive order prohibition relating to electronic surveillance. You should note, however, that the attached memorandum reflects an assumption, which I share, that our audio countermeasure activities have the prior consent of the persons who control the facilities being "swept."
- 2. The attached memorandum may be of broad interest within the Intelligence Community, since what goes for the CIA should go for the other agencies as well.

	3.	The Office of Legislative Counsel may want to touch base with Frank in view of the interest in this problem that has been expressed by				
_			J	i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i	$\neg$	
				ANTHONY A. LAPHAM		

Attachment

25X1

## Approved For Release 2005/12/05 : CIA-RDP82M00345R000700010031-4

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

THROUGH

: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM

: Robert W. Gambino Director of Security

SUBJECT

: CIA Audio Countermeasures Within the United States

1. The term "Audio Countermeasures" (ACM) is defined to mean all the procedures employed by Office of Security specialists to determine if CIA facilities, installation premises, certain residences or personnel are subject to hostile electronic surveillance. It includes the examination and analysis of telephone and intercommunication systems (instruments, terminals, frames, lines and electronics); telephone and power transmission lines including searches for carrier current devices; all signals appearing in the radio frequency spectrum and procedures for detecting optical surveillance systems including laser, light emitting diedes and closed circuit TV. For the purposes of ACM, the radio frequency spectrum is defined in accordance with the Fourth Edition of "Reference Data for Radio Engineers" and "Frequency Allocations 10 KHz to 275 GHz" published by RCA Frequency Bureau, RCA Corp., 15 July 1973.

Band Number	Frequency Range	Metric Subdivision	Frequency Subdivision
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	3 to 30 KHz 30 to 300 KHz 300 to 3000 KHz 3 to 30 MHz 30 to 300 MHz 300 to 3000 MHz 3 to 30 GHz 30 to 300 GHz 300 to 3000 GHz 3 THz	Myriametric Waves Kilometric Waves Hectrometric Waves Decametric Waves Metric Waves Decimetric Waves Centimetric Waves Millimetric Waves	VLF LF MF HF VHF VHF SHF EHF

25X1

## CONFIDENTIAL

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt